



Version of attached file:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Not peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Hannan, Michael and Polos, Laszlo and Hsu, Greta (2009) ’Modal constructions in sociological arguments.’,
Working Paper. Durham University, Durham.





The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk







University of California, Davis
January 12, 2009
Abstract
This paper introduces modal logics to a sociological audience. We first
provide an overview of the formal properties of this family of models and
outline key differences with classical first-order logic. We then build a
model to represent processes of perception and belief core to social the-
ories. To do this, we define our multi-modal language and then add sub-
stantive constraints that specify the inferential behavior of modalities for
perception, default, and belief. We illustrate the deployment of this lan-
guage to the theory of legitimation proposed by Hannan, Pólos, and Car-
roll (2007). This paper aims to call attention to the potential benefits of
modal logics for theory building in sociology.




Sociological theorizing can benefit from logical formalization in three substan-
tially different ways. The first reconstructs existing sociological arguments in
standard logics, usually propositional logic or first-order logic1 to check on the
validity of arguments and to sharpen them (see Péli, Bruggeman, Mausch, and
O’Nualláin 1994; Hannan 1997; Kamps and Pólos 1999; Péli, Pólos, and Han-
nan 2000). The second develops new approaches for logical rendering of argu-
mentation in sociological theory development (Pólos and Hannan 2002, 2004;
Hannan et al. 2007). The third way focuses on the (formal) languages used to
express core concepts in sociological theories. This paper focuses on the third
way of using logic to sharpen sociological theory building.
A key choice in this kind of work concerns what family of semantic models
can establish a firm imagery of the intended interpretation of the theory (Bach
1986). Such imagery can turn out to be a useful heuristic tool for identifying
new empirically testable claims and substantively meaningful insights.
We propose an intensional, multi-modal language as an attractive alterna-
tive for expressing core sociological concepts. The semantics for these modal
languages (models for modal languages in technical jargon) are usually pre-
sented as Kripke frames (also called possible-world semantics); we describe
and apply this modeling technique in this paper.
We base our proposal on the belief that retaining the core sociological in-
sight is challenging in translations from natural language to an artificial (con-
structed) language. Many efforts at formalization introduce assumptions and
simplify arguments in ways that fail to resonate closely with intuitions behind
the original theories (Hannan 1997). In such cases, the insights that made these
arguments appealing in the first place are washed away. A structural mismatch
between theories and formalization tools makes this challenge particularly se-
vere.
Logicians design different logics to represent different patterns of reason-
ing. A core insight might be extremely cumbersome or even impossible to cap-
ture with the language of one logic, while a different logic facilitates a parsimo-
nious and sensible interpretation. Finding a language with adequate expressive
power is a fundamental issue for any formalization effort (van Benthem 1995a).
1An interesting exception is Montgomery’s (2005) reconstruction of role theory in a (stan-
dard) nonmonotonic logic.
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While there are a great variety of logics, the default in modern science and
mathematics is classical predicate (first-order) logic. This logic provides a for-
mal characterization of the reasoning patterns typically found in mathematics.
It should not be surprising, however, that typical patterns of reasoning within
mathematics do not fit easily with those inherent in much sociological theoriz-
ing.
A key mismatch arises from the fact that predicate logic builds on the prop-
erty called extensionality. The extension of a predicate refers to the set of ob-
jects for which the predicate is true. For instance, the predicate “Is red” has as
its extension the set of objects (in the universe of discourse) that are red, that
satisfy the property “is red”. In an extensional logic the replacement of names
by other names that point to the same entities (that have identical denotations)
yields logically indistinguishable expressions. Consider a simple version of a
well-known example: “Superman” and “Clark Kent” both designate the same
(fictional) entity. In an extensional framework, the statements “Superman is
faster than a speeding bullet” and “Clark Kent is faster than a speeding bullet”
are equivalent (have the same sense, the same truth value).2 There is no reason
to suppose that any agent treats these claims as interchangeable. It is easy to
see that sociological intuitions can get lost in the translation when extensional
logics are used to interpret natural-language arguments.
Instead of forcing formalizations of sociological theories into an ill-fitting
extensional mold or dismissing formalization outright, researchers should con-
sider logics that provide a better fit. Modern logic offers some appealing alter-
natives. We argue that modal logics deserve attention. The syntax and seman-
tics of appropriately chosen modal logics can remain close to natural-language
arguments, and still one can derive implications, prove soundness, check for
consistency, and so forth.
First we offer a gentle introduction to modal logic and possible-worlds se-
mantics. Second we discuss informally some of the desired properties of the
temporal multi-modal logic we develop. After discussing these desiderata, we
2In the original discussion of this idea, Frege (1892) introduced the distinction between sinn
(sense or meaning) and bedeutung (reference) using the example of the “morning star” and the
“evening star,” which astronomers discovered are the same object—Venus. He argued that the
sentences “The ‘morning star’ is the ‘morning star’.” and “The ‘morning star’ is the ‘evening
star.’” have the same meaning, because the two names point to the same object. However, the
first sentence seems to be true merely by virtue of the law that every object is identical to itself;
but the second sentence states an astronomical discovery.
3
lay out a definition of our multi-modal language and of its semantics. These
definitions allow us to prove that this logic actually delivers what we wanted
from it. The next step in the model building adds some substantive (or mate-
rial) constraints to the general model so that the belief frames we define offer
a reasonably realistic model of the considered perception–default–belief pro-
cesses. In the final step, we attempt to illustrate the potential value of one
modal logic by considering (and sharpening) its role in the theory of legitima-
tion proposed by Hannan et al. (2007).
1 Models of the Language and Models of Reality
Before considering modal languages, we briefly sketch the two alternative ap-
proaches to defining a logic and its language; and we explain which we utilize.
The syntactic (or axiomatic) approach treats logics as pure formalisms. The se-
mantic (or model-based approach) builds the language of a logic to reflect the
truth and falsity of statements about the world.
The syntactic/axiomatic approach to the logical consequence relation is
based on derivations of proofs. Specifically this approach holds that the for-
mula ψ follows as a syntactic consequence of another formula ϕ if and only if
there is a proof ofψ fromϕ. Proofs begin with logical axioms and the premise(s)
and end with the proven theorem. A logical axiom can be, for example, any
instantiation of the following schema ϕ→ (ψ→ ϕ). (This axiom is sound be-
cause it is false only if ϕ is both true and false.) New formulas can be added to
a proof if they can be derived from the logical axioms and premises. The syn-
tactic method has to specify the legitimate derivation steps to tell what can be
derived. Two common choices are (1) substitution (in the formula aboveϕ and
ψ can be substituted with any proposition and the formula remains an axiom)
and (2) modus ponens (if ϕ→ψ and ϕ is derivable, then so is ψ).
The other main option, the semantic/model-theoretic approach, defines
the logical consequence relation in terms of the meanings of the premise(s)
and of the conclusion.3 The details of such an approach depend on the kind
of meanings used in the semantic model. Two typical choices for meanings
3A combination of the syntactic and semantic approach tries to prove the completeness the-
orem, to show that a given syntactic rendering of the relation and a semantic definition actually
depict exactly the same relation.
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are (1) truth conditions and (2) update conditions. According to the truth-
conditional approach, a set of premises semantically imply a conclusion if the
truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. (We discuss the
update-conditional approach below.)
For our purposes the semantic option offers relevant insights. We want to
model belief reports, perceptual reports, and taken-for-granted assumptions
mean in terms of statements about an agent’s information about the world.
Therefore we focus on logical consequence within a semantic framework. Ac-
cording to one common-sense and widespread rendering, the logical conse-
quence relation must be truth preserving: no valid inference should yield false
conclusions from true premises (Etchemendy 1990). Unfortunately it is nor-
mally hard to determine the truth of a proposition (in the world). Nonetheless,
we can provide a systematic answer to the question of truth (and falsity) by
defining formal models that are structured in the same way as the propositions.
This means providing what logicians call a model of the language.
This model-theoretic strategy yields a recursive definition of the truth of
any proposition stated in the language. Consider first the so-called atomic sen-
tences, those that do not have subparts that are themselves sentences. Suppose
that all relevant atomic propositions have a “subject-predicate” format, such as
“Anchor Brewing Co. is a microbrewer.” Then the truth/falsity of any atomic
sentence can be determined by knowing (1) the extension of each predicate
and (2) the denotations of subjects’ names. A sentence stated in this language
is true just in case the denotation of the subject of the sentence is an element
of the extension of the predicate stated by the sentence. For instance, the sen-
tence referred to above is true if the entity denoted by “Anchor Brewing Co.”
belongs to the set of “microbrewers” (lies in the extension of that concept) as it
does in the real world. For more complex, molecular sentences (those that are
not atomic) the truth-conditions can be defined recursively. For example, ¬ϕ
is true if and only if ϕ is false, ϕ→ψ is true if and only if it is not the case that ϕ
is false and ψ is true, and so forth.
Such a recursive definition of a language yields a family of models. Mod-
els within a family can differ with respect to the denotations of the names and
the extensions of the predicates (which depend on the substantive application,
whether we study brewers or banks, for instance), but they all follow the same
general pattern. Once we have defined a family of models of the language, a
specification of the logical consequence relation almost automatically offers
itself. Proposition ϕ logically implies proposition ψ (in notation: ϕ⇒ψ) if no
model (in the family) makesϕ true while makingψ false. In other words, the set
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of propositions composed of the premise(s) and the negation of the conclusion
cannot be satisfied. (Because any finite number of premises can be replaced by
their conjunction, defining the consequence relation for one premise suffices
for the cases we consider in this paper.)
2 Modal Logics
Now we consider the problem of modeling propositions that contain concepts
involving an agent’s perceptions, taken for granteds, or beliefs. Such concepts
are central to sociological theories, including the one we analyze. If we want to
argue about (and possibly predict) the consequences of what agents perceive,
take for granted, or believe, then a potentially fruitful strategy is turning to
modern logic for languages that can express these ideas formally. Logic can be
used to produce coherent models of perceptions, defaults, and beliefs. These
models are obviously based on idealizations. Whether these idealizations are
ultimately justifiable should be tested by examining their implications empir-
ically. If these models predict empirically, then they are justified as (at least)
heuristic tools.
Belief statements typically express a relationship between an agent and a
proposition. Consider for instance the statement “John believes that Anchor
Brewing Co. is a microbrewer.” This sentence expresses a relationship between
the agent “John” and the proposition “Anchor Brewing Co. is a microbrewer”.
Linguists refer to such sentences as propositional attitude reports. We focus on
a subtype of such reports, which we call belief reports.
We try to utilize some of the insights developed in linguistics and semantics
in studies of propositional attitudes. Attitude verbs such as “believes,” “doubts,”
“perceives,” and “assumes” are functional expressions4
The dominant Fregean tradition in formal semantics recognizes two types
of functional expressions: extensional and intensional. An extensional functor
operates on the denotations of its arguments; an intensional functor operates
on the connotation (intension) of its argument. (We explain the formal notion
of intension below.)
4A functional expression takes certain linguistic expressions and combines them into a new
expression. For example, the conjunction takes two formulas and produces a new formula with
two argument slots: one for a noun phrase (a name) and one for a sentence (a proposition).
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Clearly, attitude verbs are extensional in their first arguments: replacing
“John” with a different name (e.g., John’s social security number) does not change
the truth value of the belief statement so long as the new name refers to the
same agent as “John” does. The second argument slot plays a different role: it
contains a declarative sentence. If we replace “Anchor Brewing Co. is a micro-
brewer” with another proposition with the same truth value, then we cannot
always predict the truth value of the resulting proposition. Both “Anchor Brew-
ing Co. is a microbrewer” and “Sierra Nevada Brewing Co. is a microbrewer”
happen to be true in the actual world. It might still be the case that the proposi-
tion “John believes that Anchor Brewing Co. is a microbrewer” is true and “John
believes that Sierra Nevada Brewing Co. is a microbrewer” is false. Such con-
ditions violate the property of extensionality. Logicians refer to attitudes with
this kind of property as intensional attitudes.
Because belief attitudes are intensional, it is natural to argue that inten-
sional logics have potential value as tools for building systematic models of
argumentation about belief reports. And we pursue this path. But we face a
complication. Devising adequate criteria for identifying whether a pair of atti-
tude reports point to the same scenario has proven to be difficult. It seems safe
to argue for a sufficient criterion: (1) if two propositions are logically equivalent,
then they refer to the same scenario, and (2) if proposition ϕ logically implies
propositionψ (in notation,ϕ⇒ψ), then the scenario referred to by proposition
ϕ is a part of the scenario referred to by proposition ψ.5 Taking this considera-
tion into account, we conclude that belief reports should satisfy a principle of
logical closure. Consider the belief attitude report “John believes ϕ” and sup-
pose that ϕ logically implies (entails) ψ (in notation ϕ⇒ψ). Then it is also the
case that “John believes ψ.” In technical terms, belief reports should be closed
under logical deduction.
In short, we think that appropriate languages for analyzing belief reports
contain sentential operators (operators that take sentences and yield other sen-
tences) that are (1) intensional and (2) closed under logical deduction. These
two properties define modalities.
In logic, the term modality originally was used (by C. S. Lewis and others)
to refer to qualities of the truth of an expression, especially the possibility and
5Those who assume that two scenarios that are mutually part of each other are identical
would find the first consideration redundant. We prefer to follow a noncommittal approach on
this issue.
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necessity of the truth of an expression. A statement might be possibly true, nec-
essarily true, and so forth. The technical apparatus developed to analyze logics
that contain operators for possibility and necessity were successfully general-
ized for analysis of statements about an agent’s attitude toward an object or
relation, and the term modality now generally includes expressions of percep-
tions, beliefs, and valuations. We use this extended sense of modality.
The various models for modal logics all build on the technical notion of pos-
sible worlds. In constructions using this notion, the model concerns a set of
possible worlds, where each world consists of a distinct state of affairs defined
over the propositions to be analyzed.6 For instance, suppose we consider the
possible worlds defined over two statements about empirical facts, say ϕ and
ψ. Each statement can be true or false. So we have four possible worlds: (1)
ϕ∧ψ (both sentences are true), (2) ¬(ϕ∨ψ) (both are false), (3) ϕ∧¬ψ and (4)
¬ϕ∧ψ.
Agents often have incomplete and inaccurate perceptions, taken for grant-
eds, and beliefs about the world around them. For instance, they do not per-
ceive some aspects of reality, and some of what they perceive as true is false in
the actual world. For example, someone might believe ϕ∧ψ when in reality
ϕ∧¬ψ is true. Because the standard predicate logic deals only with facts (ex-
tensional statements), it does not provide a way to express such misperception.
Since social and behavioral theories often assume that agents base their behav-
iors on their perceptions and recognize that perceptions are fallible, a language
that can express possible worlds might improve formal translation efforts in
sociology.
Formal Properties of Modal Logics
To this point we have treated modalities informally. Now we begin to spell out
their formal properties.
As we noted above, modalities are a class of sentential (or propositional) op-
erators. These operators take sentences as input and produce other sentences
6Opinions differ on the ontological status of the possible worlds. At one extreme, Lewis ar-
gues that the possible worlds are a set of actual worlds, much as some contemporary physicists
argue for the existence of parallel universes. Others regard the set of worlds as nothing more
than an index over a set of possible alternative assignments of truth values. We adopt the latter
view, as will make clear below.
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as output. Modal operators are sentential operators that are closed under log-
ical deduction. (A sentential operator ω lacks closure under logical deduction
if it is possible that ω(ϕ) is true for some proposition ϕ but ω(ψ) is false even
though ϕ logically implies ψ.)
The modalities first studied by philosophers (at least as far back as Aristotle
and Diodoros Cronos) are the metaphysically important modalities for neces-
sity (“it is necessary that”) and possibility (“it is possible that”). The customary
notation uses for the necessity operator and ♦ for the possibility operator.
These modalities are duals of each other. “It is necessary that” means that
“it is not possible that it is not” (in notation,ϕ⇔¬♦¬ϕ, and conversely♦ϕ⇔
¬¬ϕ).
What other properties ought to be attributed to these modalities is contro-
versial. Consider, for example, the principle that anything that is necessary is
also true: ϕ⇒ ϕ. If “necessary” is interpreted as “it ought to be the case,”
then the principle is not valid. But, other accepted interpretations do make the
principle valid. Modal logics with this property are called alethic logics; those
that do not incorporate this principle but use the weaker principle ϕ⇒ ♦ϕ
are called deontic logics.
We think that a sensible model of belief reports as modalities requires use of
deontic logic. This is because we need to allow for the possibility of false beliefs,
and the alethic principle cannot hold in general if beliefs can be mistaken. On
the other hand, we want beliefs to be consistent. That is, if an agent believes
that the propositionϕ, then we want to constrain the situation so that the agent
also believes that¬ϕ is false. This is exactly what is needed to grant the deontic
principle.
Another debated principle, imposed in some modal logics, holds that nec-
essarily true statements are necessarily necessarily true: ϕ⇒ϕ. For be-
lief attitudes this principle has potential value for distinguishing perceptions,
defaults, and beliefs on the basis of positive introspection. For example, if
ϕ⇒ϕ holds and ϕ is interpreted as “the focal agent believes that ϕ is
the case”, then the same agent “believes that she believes that ϕ” is implied by
“she believes that ϕ is the case.” But we do not see any reason to stipulate that
such a strong positive introspection characterizes our agents, and we do not
impose this principle.
The study of modal logics flourished in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury after Saul Kripke discovered systematic ways of making sense of these pro-
liferating logics and proposed a (formal) semantics for modalities. The easiest
way to explain Kripke models uses Leibniz’s idea of possible worlds. The now-
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Table 1: Example of all of the possible worlds for the case of three propositions
expressed in terms of truth values.
w1 w2 w3 w4
|ϕ| = T |ϕ| = T |ϕ| = T |ϕ| = F
|ψ| = T |ψ| = T |ψ| = F |ψ| = T
|χ| = T |χ| = F |χ| = T |χ| = T
w5 w6 w7 w8
|ϕ| = F |ϕ| = F |ϕ| = T |ϕ| = F
|ψ| = F |ψ| = T |ψ| = F |ψ| = F
|χ| = T |χ| = F |χ| = F |χ| = F
standard view holds thatϕ is true if and only if ϕ is true in all possible worlds
and that ♦ϕ is true just in case ϕ is true in at least one possible world. This
sounds straightforward, provided that we are willing to assume a multiplicity
of possible worlds. Any effort to collect information about different possible
worlds, however, is problematic, because we can study empirically only one of
the possible worlds—the actual one.
For our purposes it is sufficient to consider possible worlds as different “in-
terpretations” of the language of a (non-modal) propositional logic; this allows
us to avoid further complicating the setup. In propositional logic, as we ex-
plained above, all propositions are built from atomic propositions by applica-
tion of functions such as negation, conjunction, disjunction, material implica-
tion, and so forth. For a classical propositional logic an interpretation of the
language is nothing but the assignment of truth values to the atomic proposi-
tions. The truth value of any complex proposition is determined by the truth
values of its atomic propositions. Suppose, for example, that we have three
atomic propositions (ϕ, ψ, and χ) whose truth values are indicated by |ϕ| = T
(for true), |ϕ| = F (for false), etc. Table 1 shows the set of possible worlds (al-
ternative interpretations) for this language. In general, n-many propositional
atoms yield 2n possible worlds.
In classical logic, the truth of a proposition depends only on the chosen
model of the language. A model of the language of classical first-order logic
recursively defines truth values for all the propositions of the language as we
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noted above. First the atomic propositions get their truth values defined (in-
terpreted, as we used the term above), and then the complex propositions get
their truth values following their logical form (their syntactic composition). For
example, a negated proposition is true if the proposition is false, and so forth.
This construction of the language relies on a property called truth functional-
ity: the truth (or falsity) of the components together with the (fixed) definitions
of the logical operators defines the truth of compositions.
Modal logics are more complicated because some compositions do not nec-
essarily respect truth functionality. Because truth values differ among possible
worlds by construction, truth and falsity in an intensional case depends both
on the model of the language and on the choice of the world. Questions of
truth and falsity for modal logics focus on a function, called an intension, that
tells for every possible world whether a given proposition is true or false in that
world. An intension associates a proposition, say ϕ, and a possible world, say
w , with a truth-value of 1 or 0, for truth and falsity, respectively. In the common
notation for intensions, [[ϕ]]w = 1 indicates that ψ is true in the possible world
w , and [[ϕ]]w = 0 indicates that ϕ is false in that world. Consider Table 1 and
notice that reading across the rows of the table that concernϕ shows concretely
an example of an intension: the set of the eight ordered pairs whose first ele-
ment is a world and second element is the indicated truth or falsity of ϕ in that
world.
Clearly any propositional atom is possible—each is true in exactly half of
the possible worlds. On the other hand, no propositional atom is necessary, be-
cause all are false in half of the possible worlds. So is any proposition necessary?
Yes, for example, (ϕ→ (ψ→ χ))→ ((ϕ→ψ)→ (ϕ→ χ)) is true in all of the pos-
sible worlds, not surprisingly, because it is a (propositional) tautology. Now the
following question rises rather naturally: are there any non-tautological neces-
sary truths? It turns out that there are none in this system.
In scientific theory building, we are interested in contingent (non-tautological)
necessities, those that can be shown to be false. To obtain these we need to in-
troduce an accessibility relation,R, on the set of possible worlds. The choice of
accessibility relation(s) lies at the core of defining a modal logic for substantive
theory, as we explain below. Given a choice of an accessibility relation, we rel-
ativize necessity and possibility to given possible worlds as depending on truth
values in the worlds accessible from them. This means admitting that certain
propositions are necessarily true under some circumstances but not under oth-
ers.
The definition of the truth of a modal proposition works as follows. A propo-
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sition of the form ϕ is true in the world w just in case the proposition ϕ is true
in all the worlds w ′ that are accessible from w, those that satisfyR(w, w ′).
Different choices of an accessibility relation (different assumptions about
its algebraic properties) define interestingly different modalities. Take, for ex-
ample, the property of reflexivity: the assumption that ∀w[R(w, w)]. If every
possible world is accessible from itself, then any proposition that is necessary
in a world w (and therefore true in all the possible worlds that are accessible
from w) must be true in w as well: ϕ → ϕ. Reflexivity of the accessibility
relation defines the semantic models for alethic logics; the lack of reflexivity
characterizes deontic logics.7 We argue below that imposing reflexivity for be-
lief attitudes leads to substantively implausible implications.
Note that the lack of reflexivity differs from irreflexivity. The absence of re-
flexivity means only that there might be worlds that are not accessible from
themselves, while irreflexivity requires that no world is accessible from itself. Ir-
reflexivity obviously imposes a stronger requirement. In the case of beliefs, im-
posing this property means postulating that beliefs are always mistaken about
any world (because no world is accessible to itself). Such faulty beliefs surely
occur, but this is not the only possibility our model should accommodate.
Similarly, transitivity of accessibility relation has interesting consequences.
Suppose that ∀w, w ′, w ′′ [R(w, w ′)∧R(w ′, w ′′) → R(w, w ′′)]. The transitivity
assumption implies that ϕ→ϕ. This is easy to show by showing that as-
suming the opposite leads to a contradiction.8
To get deontic logics we need to exclude isolated worlds, those from which
no other world is accessible. (In such a world every proposition is necessary,
but no proposition is possible.) The property of the accessibility relation called
seriality rules out isolated worlds: ∀w ∃w ′ [R(w, w ′)]. Now if ϕ is true in w ,
then ϕ is true in all w ′ for whichR(w, w ′) holds and there exists such a w ′. In
other words, there is a w ′ for whichR(w, w ′) holds andϕ is true in w ′, which is
the truth condition for ♦ϕ being true in w .
We now move from these very general considerations to discussion of the
7To define deontic logics one also needs to impose seriality—see below.
8For the sake of the argument, assume that in the world w ϕ is true and ϕ is false.
Since ϕ is false in w , there must be a w ′ such thatR(w, w ′) and ϕ is false in w ′. However
if ϕ is false in w ′, then there exists a w ′′ such thatR(w ′, w ′′) and ϕ is false in w ′′. Now, due
to transitivity we haveR(w ′, w ′′), that is♦¬ϕ is true in w , which contradicts the fact thatϕ is
true in w .
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modalities needed for our substantive applications.
3 Belief Attitudes for Perception, Default, and Belief
We refer to an agent’s information state about a factual situation as a set of be-
liefs. Beliefs depend upon both perceptions and defaults. Specifically we define
two basic modalities, for perception and default, and a third modality, for be-
lief, that builds on them.
Perception is generally partial. Although any well-formed proposition must
be either true or false in reality, the best one can say about perception is that
it makes some propositions true, others false, and leaves open the truth/falsity
of others. This kind of partiality means that even factually correct perception
cannot identify exactly what the actual world looks like. Even if everything that
is perceived is true, certain facts might not be observed. At best, perception can
achieve an accurate circumscription of the actual world. Perception can also be
inaccurate. In other words, perception can paint a picture of a world, but it is
not the real world—just a different possible world. For these reasons, it makes
sense to regard perception as providing a set of possible worlds (and the real
world might even be absent from the set due to faulty perception).
These arguments lead to the conclusion that, if perception-based behavior
differs from fact-based behavior, then it is useful to construct different possible
worlds and specify the relations among them. Note that the accessibility rela-
tion between possible worlds and the fact that perceptions (as well as default
and beliefs) are relative to the actual world provides a useful way to express the
context dependence of these belief attitudes.
As perceptions are partial, sometimes an agent perceives neither ϕ nor its
negation, ¬ϕ. Because the partiality of perception generates uncertainty, it is
natural that mechanisms sometimes emerge that eliminate gaps. Default as-
sumptions turn out to be useful for filling gaps in perception. If an agent lacks
perceptual evidence about the value of a relevant fact but does have an appli-
cable default, then she uses the default to “fill in” the missing facts.
Defaults shape beliefs only in the absence of a current perception of the
facts in question. Thus defaults are sticky: the first applied assumption defines
the belief. On the other hand, audience members recognize whether they as-
sumed a fact or perceived it directly, at least in the past. Although beliefs shape
behavior, beliefs based on taken-for-granted assumptions get exposed to revi-
sion due to direct perceptions that conflict with the assumed facts. The tem-
13
poral order of perceptions matters. In case of conflict, more recent perceptions
replace older ones. In this respect perceptions do not have the same sort of
stickiness as defaults.
The applications considered by Hannan et al. (2007) and the one analyzed
in this paper concern producers/products and audiences in domains. The agents
care about the values of certain features of the producers or products in their
focal domain. So the language has to contain atomic formulas of the following
form: f (x, t ) = v , where f stands for a (relevant) feature, x refers to a product
or producer, t is a time point, and v is a value of f . We use the classical logical
constants, such as ∧,∨,→,↔,∃,∀, and = in the usual manner. We introduce
three new logical constants that are defined for an (arbitrary) audience mem-
ber y and a sentence (formula) ϕ. We use the following notation for these new
logical constants:
P y ϕ stands for “The agent y perceives that ϕ is the case.”
D y ϕ stands for “The agent y takes for granted that ϕ is the case.”
B y ϕ stands for “The agent y believes that ϕ is the case.”
In what follows we often omit the lower indexes if this simplification does not
lead to any confusion.
So far, we have offered an informal description of how the three belief atti-
tudes relate to one another. To make sure that all relevant parts of the desired
imagery are in the picture, we need to provide a model that characterizes the in-
ferential behavior of these belief operators in terms of a systematic semantics.
That is, we define a logical model for the language containing these operators.
In building a model, we seek to satisfy the following constraints:
1. Perception is partial at all time points.
2. Beliefs must be grounded in either perception or taken-for-granted as-
sumptions.
3. As seeing is believing, perception (at least temporarily) overrides earlier
beliefs.
4. Defaults shape beliefs (unless there is perceptual evidence to the con-
trary).
5. Beliefs come from perceptions or defaults.
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6. Lasting beliefs develop if lasting taken-for granted assumptions are not
contradicted by perceptual evidence.
Accessibility Relations
To model the three belief attitudes we introduce three accessibility relations:
RP,RD, andRB. We denote the full set of possible worlds by W .
These accessibility relations must share some properties (introduced above
in sketching modal logic) to meet all the stated desiderata. First, isolated worlds
must be ruled out. In the case of perception, isolation would mean that agents
perceive every proposition to be true, in contradiction with the partiality of per-
ception. In isolated worlds, taken-for-granted assumptions are useless too, be-
cause absurd (contradictory) feature values are taken for granted. In the case
of beliefs some might find this situation ideal until it is recognized that the
negations of propositions are propositions too, so beliefs would be inconsis-
tent. Therefore, we postulate seriality for each accessibility relation (for any
agent).
Postulate 3.1 (Seriality). there are no isolated worlds.
∀R, w [(R ∈ {RP,RB,RD})∧ (w ∈W )→∃w ′ [(w ′ ∈W )∧R(w, w ′)]].
A second important general consideration argues that we rule out reflexiv-
ity for the accessibility relations to avoid imposing the restriction that whatever
is perceived is true: P ϕ→ϕ. This would be a ludicrous constraint on percep-
tion. The damage of allowing reflexivity for the two other modalities would also
be considerable. In case of defaults, it would imply that taken for grantedness
yields satisfaction. To avoid these highly undesirable consequences we add the
following postulate.
Postulate 3.2 (Lack of reflexivity). The accessibility relations are not reflexive.
∀R∃w [(R ∈ {RP,RP,RD})∧ (w ∈W )∧¬R(w, w)].
For our model to make sense, the three modalities cannot be independent.
For example, we required that any perception leads to belief. To guarantee this
we need the following postulate:
Postulate 3.3 (Seeing (perceiving) is believing). The worlds that are belief-accessible




It might be helpful to explain the reasoning behind the formal statement of
this postulate. Suppose that this postulate is false (for some focal world) for
the proposition ϕ. The negation of the formula expression Postulate 3.3 would
mean that the ϕ is true in all of the perception-accessible worlds but false in at
least one belief-accessible world. In such a case, seeing is not believing; and we
want to rule out this possibility.
Our next postulate guarantees that available defaults fill the gaps in a set of
beliefs.
Postulate 3.4. Agents who have available defaults use them to fill what would
otherwise be gaps in their beliefs.
Let [[ϕ]] denote the set of all the possible worlds where ϕ is true (according to the
agent’s defaults).
∀ϕ, w[∀w ′ [RD(w, w ′)→ (w ′ ∈ [[ϕ]])]∧∃w ′ [RB(w, w ′)∧ (w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]])]
→∀w ′ [RP(w, w ′)→ (w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]])]].
The first sub-formula ∀w ′ [RD(w, w ′)→ (w ′ ∈ [[ϕ]])] expresses that the formula
ϕ is true in all worlds default-accessible from w . That is, ϕ is a default in w .
The second sub-formula ∃w ′ [RB(w, w ′)∧ (w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]])] expresses that ϕ is false
in at least one possible world that is belief-accessible from w . In other words,
the agent does not believe ϕ in w . The postulate states these two conditions
jointly imply ∀w ′ [RP(w, w ′) → (w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]])], that is, that ϕ is false in all worlds
perceptually accessible from w , that the agent does not perceive ϕ in w . So
the formal statement of the postulate says that the only way that a proposition
can be a default yet not be believed to be true is that the agent perceives it to
be false. Alternatively, if the agent does not perceive that the proposition is
false and treats the truth of the proposition as a default, then the agent believes
that the proposition is true. Defaults fill in gaps in perception (unless there is
perceptual evidence to the contrary).
Postulate 3.5. Anything that an agent believes as long as there is no contrary
perceptual evidence is a default.
∀ϕ, w[∀w ′ [RB(w, w ′)→ (w ′ ∈ [[ϕ]])]∧∃w ′ [RD(w, w ′)∧ (w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]])]
→∀w ′ [RP(w, w ′)→ (w ′ ∈ [[ϕ]])]]
where we use the [[ϕ]] notation as above.
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The first sub-formula, ∀w ′ [RB(w, w ′) → (w ′ ∈ [[ϕ]])], expresses that the for-
mula ϕ is true in all of the worlds that are belief-accessible from w . That is, the
agent believes ϕ in w . The second sub-formula, ∃w ′ [RD(w, w ′)∧ (w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]])],
expresses that ϕ is false at least one possible world that is default-accessible
from w . In other words, the agent does not take ϕ for granted in w . The pos-
tulate states these two conditions jointly imply ∀w ′ [RP(w, w ′) → (w ′ ∈ [[ϕ]])].
That is,ϕ is true in all worlds perceptually accessible from w , which means that
the agent does perceive ϕ in w . So the formal statement of the postulate says
that the only way that a proposition can be believed yet not be a default is that
the agent perceives it to be true.
Recall that we want to eliminate from the model those beliefs that have
nothing to do with perceptions or taken-for-granted assumptions. We do so
by introducing the following postulate.
Postulate 3.6. Worlds that are both perceptually accessible and default accessi-
ble are also belief accessible.
RD∩RP ⊆RB.
Figure 1 illustrates the joint effects of Postulates 3.3 and 3.6.
The foregoing postulates define the elements of what is generally called a
Kripke frame. In this case, it is a frame for beliefs.
Definition 3.1 (Belief frame).
Let W be the set of possible worlds (for a propositional language) andRP,RD,
andRB be the accessibility relations (for an unspecified agent). We call
〈W,RP,RD,RB〉,
the belief frame of the agent if the accessibility relationsRP,RD, andRB satisfy
Postulates 3.1–3.6.
With this definition of the belief frame, we can derive a set of theorems
that characterize the interactions among the modalities and that relate to the
desiderata that we spelled out above. The five items on our list of desiderata are
logical consequences of the Kripke belief frame.
Theorem 3.1. Perception is partial.
∀y ∃ϕ, t , x [¬ P y ϕ(x, t )].
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Figure 1: Relationships among the accessibility relations for perception, de-
fault, and belief according to Postulates 3.3 and 3.6. Regions I and II are empty
according to Postulate 3 and Postulate 5 makes III empty.
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Proof. According to Postulate 3.1 (Seriality),
∀w [(w ∈W )→∃w ′ [(w ′ ∈W )∧RP(w, w ′)]].
We can use the perception-accessible world w ′ to build ϕ in a way that makes
the theorem true. Two cases need to be considered. First suppose that the state
w ′ is such that some atomic propositions are true (this would allow the first
seven of the worlds in the example given earlier in Table 1, but not the eighth).
Take the disjunction of the negations of all of these atomic formulas. Because
the resulting formula is false (by construction) in w ′, it cannot be the case that
the agent perceives that this formula is true in w . This follows from the defi-
nition of the truth of a modal operator (a proposition is true in a world just in
case it is true in all of the worlds accessible from that world). In the case of the
perception modality, the proposition P y ϕ(x, t ) is true in a world w just in case
P y ϕ(x, t ) is true in all of the worlds that are perception-accessible from w .
In the second case, no atomic proposition is true in w ′. Then the analysis
just presented holds for the conjunction of the (false) atomic propositions.
Theorem 3.2. Beliefs are grounded in either perception or taken-for-granted as-
sumptions.
B y ϕ→ D y ϕ∨ P y ϕ.
Proof. Suppose this theorem is false: in a world w , B y ϕ∧¬ D y ϕ∧¬ P y ϕ.
Then ϕ is true in all theRB alternatives of w ; but it is false in someRP and in
someRD alternatives. Because theRP and theRD alternatives are among the
RB alternatives (due to Postulate 3.5), this cannot happen.
Theorem 3.3. Perception overrides beliefs.
P y ϕ→ B y ϕ.
Proof. Suppose this theorem is false: P y ϕ∧¬ B y ϕ is true in a world w . Then
ϕ is true in all theRP alternatives of w but false in someRB alternatives. But the
RB alternatives are among theRP alternatives, which violates Postulate 3.3.
Theorem 3.4. Defaults shape beliefs (absent perceptual evidence to the contrary)
D y ϕ∧¬ P y ¬ϕ→ B y ϕ.
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Proof. This theorem is false in w if and only if D y ϕ∧¬ P y ¬ϕ∧¬ B y ϕ is true
in w , which, in turn, requires that ϕ is true in all theRD alternatives of w but
false in allRB alternatives of w and true in someRD alternatives of w . If ϕ is
true in all of theRD alternatives to w and is false in all or someRB alternatives
of w , then the antecedent of Postulate 3.4 is satisfied. So we get
∀w ′ [RP(w, w ′)→w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]]].
Although this does not contradict the fact thatϕ true in someRP alternatives of
w (because the antecedent might not be satisfied), a contradiction can reached
if we take account of the seriality ofRP, which excludes the possibility that
∀w ′ [RP(w, w ′)→w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]]]
is vacuously true (because the antecedent is false).
Theorem 3.5. Beliefs originate from either defaults or perceptions.
B y ϕ∧¬ D y ϕ→ P y ϕ.
Proof. The proof of this theorem analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.4, but
uses Postulate 3.6 instead of Postulate 3.4. This theorem is false in w if and only
if B y ϕ∧¬ D y ϕ∧¬ P y ϕ is true in w , which, in turn, requires that ϕ is true
in all theRB alternatives of w but false in someRD alternatives of w and also
false in someRP alternatives of w . Ifϕ is true in all theRB alternatives of w and
false in someRD alternatives of w , the antecedent of Postulate 3.6 is satisfied.
So we get
∀w ′ [RP(w, w ′)→w ′ ∈ [[ϕ]]].
This does not contradict the fact that ϕ false in someRP alternatives of w .
Notation. Letϕ(x, t ) be a formula, x an object, and t a temporal parameter. (In
our substantive application below, x denotes a producer and ϕ denotes one of
its feature values at the time point t .) In the case of the belief modality,
∃ t ′∀t ′′ [(t ′ ≤ t ′′ < t )→ B y ϕ(x, t ′′)] will be abbreviated as
←−−−
B y ϕ(x, t );
∃ t ′∀t ′′ [(t < t ′′ ≤ t ′)→ B y ϕ(x, t ′′)] will be abbreviated as
−−−→
B y ϕ(x, t ).
The notation is exactly parallel for the other two modalities. When doing so
does not cause confusion, we refer to ϕ or −→ϕ (t ), etc. rather than use the full
notation in describing the language.
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Theorem 3.6. Lasting beliefs develop if lasting taken-for-granted assumptions
are not contradicted by perceptual evidence.
¬←−−−B y ϕ(t )→ (
−−−→
B y ϕ(t )←→ (
−−−→
D y ϕ(t )∧¬
−−→
P y ¬ϕ(t ))).
Proof. Let
−−−→
D y ϕ(t ) and ¬
−−→
P y ¬ϕ(t ) be the case. By the definition of the over-
arrow notation,
−−−→
D y ϕ(t ) means
∃ t1∀t ′1 [(t < t ′1 < t1)→ D y ϕ(x, t 1′)],
and ¬−−→P y ¬ϕ(t ) means
∃ t2∀t ′2 [(t < t ′2 ≤ t2)→¬ P y ¬ϕ(x, t ′2)].
Let t∗ denote the smaller of t1 and t2: t∗ =min{t1, t2}. With this definition of t∗,
it is true that
∀t ′∗ [(t < t ′∗ < t∗)→ D y ϕ(x, t ′∗)∧¬ P y ¬ϕ(x, t ′∗)].
This formula, taken together with Theorem 3.4, yields
∀t ′∗ [(t < t ′∗ < t∗)→ B y ϕ(x, t ′∗)],
i.e.,
−−−→
B y ϕ(x, t ).
To elaborate on the nature of defaults and perception we consider under
what circumstances would agents abandon default, stop to take for granted
compliance with some assumptions. It seems natural to stipulate that just be-
fore a default is abandoned the agents perceives violations instead of compli-
ance with the expectations that are no longer taken for granted. If agent y
has the default D y ϕ(t0), she abandons it at t1 if and only if t1 = i n f {t |(t0 <
t )∧¬ D y ϕ(t )}. Now we propose this condition as an axiom.9.
9Postulate and axiom are often used as synonyms. But we use these terms in parallel to in-
dicate the following difference: Postulates describe, in terms of the accessibility relations, what
a belief frames look like. However some of their properties related to the interaction between
modal and temporal considerations are too complex for us to offer easily understandable pos-
tulates that support to these properties. So we propose two axioms that describe the interaction
between the modal and temporal constructions.
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Axiom 3.1. When an agent abandons a default, she does not perceive compli-
ance with the (formerly taken for granted) expectation.
D y ϕ(x, t0)∧ (t0 < t )∧¬ D y ϕ(x, t )→
∃², t∗[(0< t∗)∧ (|t∗− inf{t |(t∗ < t )∧¬ D y ϕ(x, t )}| < ²)→¬ P y ϕ(x, t∗)]}.
We add the notion that perception is episodic and show that adding this
consideration gives a further useful characterization of the interaction of the
modalities.
Axiom 3.2. Continuous scrutiny is not possible over any interval that contains
time points where a certain fact is not perceived.
¬−−→P y ϕ(t ) and ¬
←−−
P y ϕ(t ).
With these axioms we can also prove the converse of Theorem 3.5, so we
offer the following summary:
Theorem 3.7. Lasting beliefs develop if and only if lasting taken-for-granted as-
sumptions are not contradicted by perceptual evidence.
−−−→
D y ϕ(t )∧¬
−−→
P y ¬ϕ(t )←→
−−−→
B y ϕ(t ).
Proof. Theorem 3.5 grants the → direction. So only the ← needs to be proven.
Now suppose
−−−→
B y ϕ(x, t ). Then
∃t1∀t2[(t < t2 ≤ t1)→ B y ϕ(x, t2)].
Due to Postulate 3.5 we have ∀t [ B y ϕ(x, t )→ D y ϕ(x, t )∨ P y ϕ(x, t )].
If ∀t1[ D y ϕ(x, t1)], then the theorem is proven. A proof by contraction in
this case shows that ∃t [¬ D y ϕ(x, t1)] is inconsistent with
−−−→
B y ϕ(x, t ). From
Axiom 3.2 we can conclude that ∃t2[(t2 < t1)∧ D y ϕ(x, t2)], so we can apply
Axiom 3.1.
∃²∀t∗[(t2 < t∗)∧ (0< t∗− inf{t |t ≤ t1∧¬ D y ϕ(x, t )}| < ²)→¬ P y ϕ(x, t∗)].
Due to the definition of the infimum,
∃²′∃t∗[(t2 < t∗)∧ (0< t∗− inf{t |t ≤ t1)∧¬ D y ϕ(x, t )}| < ²′∧¬ D y ϕ(x, t∗)].
Both ¬ D y ϕ(x, t∗) and ¬ P y ϕ(x, t∗) are satisfied for the time point t∗, which
in turn makes ¬ B y ϕ(x, t∗) the case.
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Theorem 3.8. Perception can generate persistent beliefs only via changes of the
taken for granteds. −−−→
B y ϕ(t )→
−−−→
D y ϕ(t );
and similarly ←−−−
B y ϕ(t )→
←−−−
D y ϕ(t ).
Proof. The
−−−→
B y ϕ(t )→
−−−→
D y ϕ(t ) is only a weakening of the← direction of The-
orem 3.7, so the part that has to be proven is
←−−−
B y ϕ(t ) →
←−−−
D y ϕ(t ). Because←−−−
B y ϕ(t ) there exists a t ′ such that for all t" t ′ < t" ≤ t → B y ϕ(t") In other
words ∀t"[t ′ < t"< t →−−−→B y ϕ(t")]. In the proof above we showed that ∃t1[t"<
t1 ≤ t ∧¬ D y ϕ(x, t1)] is inconsistent with
−−−→
B y ϕ(x, t"), so ∀t1[t" < t1 ≤ t →
D y ϕ(x, t1)] what in turn implies that
←−−−
D y ϕ(t )
A Dynamic Alternative: Information States
Where do the accessibility relations come from? This is not a relevant question
for a purely logical approach. From this perspective, the postulates circum-
scribe these relations sufficiently for the validity of an inference to be ascer-
tained. On the other hand, if one wants to look at the logical models as models
of reality, as we do, this question has to be taken seriously. We think that the
best way to approach this question is by following the lead of logical dynamics.
Dynamic logics analyze inference from the perspective of information states.
Formulas of the language come with update conditions that describe how learn-
ing a formula changes an information state. An inference connecting a set of
premises and a conclusion is valid if and only if, after updating the empty in-
formation state with all the premises, a further update with the conclusion has
no effect. In other words, the conclusion is logically implied by the premises if
the conclusion does not carry additional information beyond that contained in
the premises.
Using this approach for our purposes requires a clear definition of the infor-
mation states for belief reports. The empty information state will be a possible-
world model for which any world is related to every other world by all three
accessibility relations. Recall that such hyper-accessibility means that nothing
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is perceived, taken for granted, or believed. Therefore, in the model for our lan-
guage that corresponds to the empty information state, the focal agent does not
perceive, take for granted, or believe anything except the logical tautologies.
One simple—but misleading—view of the update process (for the belief
modality, for instance) is that it works as follows. Suppose θ denotes an in-
formation state and θ gets updated with P y ϕ. One might imagine that the
update results in an information state θ′ for which all those (w, w ′) pairs of pos-
sible worlds for which ϕ is false (i.e., where w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]]) are eliminated from the
extension of theRB relation.
The problem with this idea is that it does not respect the principle that
modalities must be closed under logical deduction. Continuing to focus on
beliefs, suppose that θ gets updated with B y ϕ. According to the (mistaken)
view we are considering, all those (w, w ′) pairs of possible worlds where ϕ is
false in w ′ (i.e., where w ′ 6∈ [[ϕ]]) would be pruned from the extension of theRB
relation. If this is all that we do, the resulting information state will not respect
Theorem 3.2, which states B y ϕ→ P y ϕ∨ D y ϕ. Unfortunately it is not clear
how we should ensure that the updated information state should respect clo-
sure under logical deduction. The conditional sentence in Theorem 3.2 says
that either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but it does not say
which. If we update the empty information state with either the negated an-
tecedent (¬ B y ϕ) or the consequent ( P y ϕ∨ D y ϕ), we do too much. The
resulting information state would contain more information than is justified in
either case because we do not know which alternative is the case.
The answer to this conundrum is recognizing that information states are
not particular multi-modal models, but instead sets of multi-modal models. If
we update an information state with a disjunctive piece of information such as
P y ϕ∨ D y ϕ, then the models in the information state get updated with ei-
ther P y ϕ or D y ϕ. So, typically, there will be twice as many models in the
information state after the update than before. Any subsequent update should
apply to all of the models in the information state. In this manner the update
process generates a tree of information states. The leaves on the tree (the termi-
nal nodes) represent all of the different ways that the world could be (given the
information added in the previous update)s. This procedure ensures that all of
the terminal nodes respect all of the postulates if all update steps are followed
by the adjustments required by the postulates.
It is worth noting that complete information about our focal agent’s percep-
tions, taken for granteds, and beliefs tells also what the agent does not perceive,
does not take for granted, and does not believe. Updating an information state
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with such negative bits of information might prune out whole branches of the
tree. In the unrealistic case of an update with the complete information, the re-
sult is a single multi-modal model whose accessibility relations are fully defined
(and the world described by this model is the actual world). This construction
provides an indirect characterization of the accessibility relations; information
collected about the perceptions, defaults, and beliefs of the agents allow us to
construct the set of belief frames that depicts this (partial) characterization.
Examples of Updates for Modal Models
In what follows we illustrate how the axioms help to build information states to
represent different attitude reports concerning one (focal) agent’s beliefs, per-
ceptions and default assumptions. An information state can comply with re-
ports on the three attitudes of the focal agent in several ways. The relevant in-
formation can be seen in diagrams of how the accessibility relations related to
these attitudes look with an empty information (belief) state and how the pat-
tern changes with different kinds of updates. For this reason we offer pictures
of the maximal accessibility relations that comply with updates. In each case,
numerous subsets of these maxima sets are also faithful to the attitude reports.
Figure 2 contains a graphical representation of any one of three maximal ac-
cessibility relations,RB,RP andRD, provided that no attitude reports are avail-
able. These are the models for empty information states. In principle10 there
are (28−1)8 different realizations of all three accessibility relations.11 In these
figures two-sided arrows represents two directional arrows. An arrow pointing
from world w1 to world w2 represents the fact that w2 is accessible from w1 or,
in other words, w2 is a belief-alternative of w1.
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Figure 2: A graphical representation of (any) one of the three accessibility re-
lations without any information of the attitude. In this model the relation is
reflexive, so at least one reflexive arrow has to be omitted, but in the empty
information state it is not known which.
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Figure 3: A graphical representation of the maximal belief accessibility relation
shown in Figure 2 following the update with B y (ψ∧¬χ)∨ (¬ϕ∧¬ψ∧χ)
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Figure 4: A graphical representation of the maximal perception accessibility
relation following the update of the empty information state with P y (¬ϕ)∨
(¬ψ∧χ)
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Effect of an update with a belief report
Now suppose we learn that the agent that she believes that either (ψ∧¬χ ) or
(¬ϕ∧¬ψ∧χ) is the case. We can model the maximal accessibility relation that
complies with the update of her belief as in Figure 3. The still-belief-possible
worlds following the update are w2, defined in Table 1 as the state of affairs
ϕ∧ψ∧¬χ, and w5 (¬ϕ∧¬ψ∧χ), and w6 (¬ϕ∧ψ∧¬χ). w2 and w6 are the (only)
two world that are consistent with here belief that ψ∧¬χ is the case while here
alternative belief that (perhaps) ¬ϕ∧¬ψ∧χ is the case, is only satisfied by w5.
The actual accessibility relation is constrained from below too. Due the se-
riality condition, every possible world must have at least one (not necessar-
ily different) world that is accessible from it. Since in the maximal relation
every world has three belief-alternatives one can choose one alternative for a
world (in three different ways) or two alternatives (three different ways) or per-
haps all three alternatives, so for every world we have seven choices. In total
(23−1)8 = 5,764,801 realizations of the belief-accessibility relation comply with
the above described attitude report.
Further update with a perception report
Next we learn that the agent perceives that¬ϕ∨(¬ψ∨¬χ) is the case. The max-
imal perceptual-accessibility relation that complies with this attitude report is
shown in Figure 4.
This maximal perceptual accessibility relation has also (23−1)8 subsets that
are faithful realizations of the perception report, just as for beliefs. This is a
large enough number that it is time to take into account the interactions due to
our axioms. From Axiom 3.3 we know thatRB ⊆RP. Clearly the maximalRB re-
lation drawn in Figure 3 does not satisfy this condition. The relation should be
an appropriate subset of the relation shown in Figure 4 instead. The change is
10Strictly speaking this is not true: in such a scenario all worlds are accessible from them-
selves so the accessibility relations are reflexive, while Postulate 3.2 requires the opposite. At
least one of the arrows that point back to a world has to be removed, and there is a multiplicity
of alternatives to choose from. For the sake of simplicity we do not discuss these details.
11Exactly eight arrows begin in each world. Any one of them might be in the accessibility
relation or not, which gives a total of 28 possibilities. To satisfy the seriality condition at least
one of these arrows have to be chosen, which gives us 28−1 possibilities per possible worlds,
and there are 8 possible worlds.
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Figure 5: A graphical representation of the maximal belief accessibility relation
after the pattern shown in Figure 3 is adjusted to comply with the perception
report shown in Figure 4 according to the constraint stated in Postulate 3.3
30
rather dramatic because there are only(!) (22−1)8 = 6,561 ways to chose the be-
lief accessibility relation and still comply with her attitude reports. (All worlds
have two belief-alternatives and we can choose either one or both.)
The impact of an update with a default
Suppose we also learn that the agent takes for granted that ψ) is the case. The
maximal accessibility relation for her defaults is shown in Figure 6, only those
four worlds can be default accessible which make ψ true.
Now we can take advantage of Postulate 3.5, which states that Rd ∩Rp ⊆
Rb . Figure 7 depicts the intersection Rd ∩ calRp for the perceptions and de-
faults considered above. It is easy to see that one further update due to the max-
imal belief accessibility relation is necessary: the intersection has to be part of
the belief accessibility relation.
To conclude: modeling of (typically partial) belief reports does not help us
to define all three accessibility relations sharply, but thanks to our axioms we
can still characterize three sets of relations that such that all elements of these
sets represent consistent possible realizations of the accessibility relations. If
the belief reports allow for a single accessibility relation, the definition becomes
sharp. If, on the other hand, no element remains in the set of possible accessi-
bility relations, then the agent’s beliefs were inconsistent.
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Figure 6: The intersection of the perception and the default accessibility rela-
tions from Figs. 5 and 6
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Figure 7: The intersection of the perception and the default accessibility rela-
tions after complying with postulate Postulate 3.5
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4 A Sociological Application: Legitimation
Now we illustrate the deployment of these theory-building tools in a sociologi-
cal argument. We build on the idea that the legitimation of a category means a
heavy reliance on defaults and develop an extension of arguments based on an
analysis of a single category to a multiple-category case. We tune our argument
to yield implications about typecasting.
At this point we combine the different types of logical approaches discussed
in the opening paragraph. For the (re)construction of the argumentation, we
take advantage of the nonmonotonic logic developed by Pólos and Hannan
(2002, 2004). We import some “metaphysical” and “ontological” insights from
Hannan et al. (2007) who treat audiences, clusters, categories, forms, and pop-
ulations of organizations (or products) as fuzzy sets and express causal claims
(about categorization and legitimation) as rules with exceptions, so that the
logic of argumentation is nonmonotonic. On top of these two components, we
now employ the language used to describe perceptions, taken-for-granted as-
sumptions, and beliefs.
Our treatment of the role of the audience in generating and legitimating
categories builds on the conceptualization developed by Hannan et al. (2007,
Chs. 2–5). The theory considers a domain as consisting of a language and a
dual role structure: producer (an agent who makes “offerings” in the domain)
and audience member (an agent. The basic linguistic objects are labels that
audience members apply to producers. This idea is implemented in terms of a
labeling function, which maps from triplets of audience members, producers,
and time points to the powerset of the set of available labels.12 We denote the
set of labels that y applies to x at time t as lab(x, y, t ). If it happens that the
agent applies the label l to x at time t , then l ∈ lab(x, y, t ).
Fuzziness plays a central role in the development of the language of a do-
main. When audience members perceive clusters of similar producers, they
might apply a label to the cluster. Sometimes they decide that certain produc-
ers “deserve” a label to varying degrees, that some fully merit the label, some
do not, and some merit it only partially. Following several major lines of work
in cognitive psychology and cognitive science, Hannan et al. (2007) treat the
extensions (memberships) of labels as fuzzy sets—meaning that membership
12The powerset of a set is the collection of all of its subsets. We refer the powerset here be-
cause an agent can apply multiple labels to the same object.
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can be partial, a matter of degree. The extent to which an audience member re-
gards a label as applicable to a producer is reflected in a grade of membership
(GoM) function. In notation, µe(l )(x, y, t ) is the grade of membership of x in
the extension of the label l from y ’s perspective at time t . Hannan et al. (2007)
equate this grade of membership in the extension of a label with the probability
over occurrences (possible situations) that the audience member will apply the
label to the object.
Highly engaged members of the audience often try to make sense of what
accounts for partiality in the applicability of a label; and they often produce
abstract representations (“theories”) of the basis for their assessments of mem-
bership. They take notice that certain configurations of feature values yield full-
fledged membership, others only moderate standing as a member, others a low
but nonzero standing, and still others a zero grade of membership. A mental
representation of such a pattern is generally called a schema. A schema for
a label is a cognitive model that explains who is in, who is out, and who lies
at various positions between these extremes. In other words, a schema estab-
lishes the meaning (or intension) of a label.
We represent schemas for labels as sets of formulas that pick out a set of
relevant features (or relations) and distinguish the values of those features (or
relations) that are consistent with membership in a label from those that are
not. We need some additional notation to define schemata formally. The or-
dering of elements in a listing of the membership of a set is generally taken to
be arbitrary. Now we fix the ordering of elements by expressing the relevant
sets of features and of their values as indexed sets.13 Let fi = { f1, f2, . . . fi } be the
indexed set of i features that are relevant for a schema. Each feature in the set
has a range of possible values. We denote the set of possible values of feature f j
by r j and a value for an object at a time point as f j ,x,t .
Definition 4.1 (Schema). A schema for a label maps pairs of audience mem-
bers and time points to an n-tuple of nonempty subsets values of the relevant
features; this subset contains the schema-conforming feature values.
σl : a× t−→P (r1)×·· ·×P (rI)
σl (y, t )= 〈sl1, . . . ,slI 〉
13Suppose we have a set x = {x1, x2, . . . xn} and a set I containing the first i natural numbers:
i= {0,1,2, . . . i }. We can express the indexed set xn = {xi | i ∈ i}.
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where a sli is the set of all the schema conforming values of the i th feature, and
I is the total number of schema-relevant features. σl (y, t )=σ(l , y, t ) is defined
provided that l ∈ lab(k, y, t ).
In a parallel to the grade of membership defined for extensions of labels,
µi (l )(x, y, t ) denotes the grade of membership of x in the “meaning” (intension)
of the label l from y ’s perspective at time t . (Hannan et al. (2007) equate the
GoM in the meaning of a label to the GoM in the schema.)
From a sociological perspective, formation of schemas matters most when
the members of an audience reach a high level of agreement about the meaning
of a label, about the schemas that give its meaning. This suggests that a cate-
gory is a special kind of semantic object in the language of the audience, a label
for which an audience achieves a high level of extensional and intensional con-
sensus. Extensional consensus is the level of agreement within the audience
about the applicability of a label to the objects in the domain. Intensional con-
sensus is the level of agreement within an audience about the degrees to which
the objects in the domain fit their schemas for a label. The predicate CAT(l , t )
indicates that l is the label of a category for the audience segment at time t .
Sometimes audience members perceive that the set of objects with a high
grade of membership in a label generally display feature values that fit the agent’s
meaning for the label. Hannan et al. (2007) argue that a belief of widespread
fit with a schema creates the impression that the reality expressed by a cate-
gory is natural and perhaps even obligatory. Therefore, generic fit and a low
frequency of observed misfits generally cause audience members to take for
granted that behaviors fit the relevant schema for those producers who bear
the label. In such cases, schemas become default assumptions of everyday life.
What changes is that the defaults get used to fill the many gaps in perceptions
that arise from incomplete information, unobservability, and ambiguity. That
is, absent evidence (perceptions) to the contrary, agents in default mode as-
sume that they will find behavior and structure consistent with the relevant
schemata whenever they encounter an organization to which they have reason
to apply the label.
Legitimation and Defaults
Defaults only matter in the absence of perception, because (perceived) facts
override defaults, as this modality is defined. So we consider situations in which
audience members’ perceptions of feature values are partial. Partial perception
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of fit to a schema is common, because only some relevant features can be per-
ceived easily. Sometimes all that one sees is that a producer makes a claim to
a label or that some other audience member (perhaps a critic or another kind
of gatekeeper) applies the label to the producer. Hannan et al. (2007) argue
that such situations of partial perception offer the analytic leverage needed to
define legitimation.
The key idea is that of a test code, a partial segment of a schema for a label
that an agent uses to make inferences about the fit to a schema for the values of
features for which she has no beliefs (perceptions or defaults). If the agent per-
ceives that an object’s perceived feature values “pass” the test code (that is, the
combination of the perceived feature values lies in the set of schema conform-
ing combinations), then the agent induces that the unperceived/non-default
values of schema relevant features also fit the schema. In technical terms, (per-
ceived) satisfaction of a test code triggers the agent to apply the default that the
unperceived/non-default feature values also satisfy the schema.
The argument is simplest in the case of “flat” schemas, those in which each
feature has equal weight in determining fit. This is because restricting attention
to flat schemas allows us to conceptualize legitimation in terms of the number
of features with certain properties. If a code system is not flat, then we would
need to take account of the weights assigned to features.
We begin by formalizing the idea of a test code for fit with a schema, which
we will use to define legitimation. We need to introduce some notation for this
task.
Notation. Let fJ denote an indexed set of values of some subset of the rele-
vant features: 0≤ J < I , where I is the number of features coded in the relevant
schema. We use the expression fi ,x,t ∈ sli to represent the fact that the i th fea-
ture of the object x has a value that complies with the schema σ(l , x, t ) at the
time point t .
With this notation in hand, we can state formally what it means to induce
conformity to a schema based on partial perception. We depart slightly from
the formulation offered by Hannan et al. (2007) (in their Definition 4.1), which
holds that induction “fills in” all non-perceived feature values when a test code
is perceived to be satisfied. By attending only to perception, this definition
overlooks the role of existing defaults. Recall that defaults shape beliefs when
there is no contrary perception. There does not appear to be any reason to
think that agents will override existing defaults based only the passing of a test
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on other features. So we refine the earlier conception in line with this intu-
ition. Specifically we propose that induction works on features for which the
agent does not have any existing beliefs (based either on perception or default)
rather than on non-perception.
Definition 4.2 (Induction from a test). An induction from a test is a situation
in which an agent’s perception that producer bears a category label and that its
feature values satisfy a test code triggers the agent to apply the default that the
values of features about which there is no belief to the contrary also satisfy the
schema.
Let σ(l , y, t )= 〈sl1, . . . ,slI 〉.
INDUC(σ(l , y, t ),tcJ )↔∀i , j , x[(l ∈ lab(x, y, t ))∧ ( j ∈ J )∧ (i ∈ I \ J )
∧ ( P y ( f j ,x,t ∈ tclj ))→ (¬ B y ( fi ,x,t 6∈ sli ))↔
−−−→
D y ( fi ,x,t ∈ sli )].
In this case we refer to tcJ = {tc j | j ∈ J } as y ’s test for judging conformity to the
schema σ(l , y, t ), in notation, TST(σ(l , y, t ),tcJ ), and we say that the test has J
items. An empty test is one with J = 0.
How many features would need to be checked before an agent treats as a
default that the rest of the features fall in a schema-consistent pattern? If every
feature must be checked, then the agent takes nothing for granted. If only a
small fraction of the relevant features must be checked, then defaults get used
in a powerful way. Hannan et al. (2007) argue that the latter case suggests that
schema conformity is taken for granted, given a small amount of positive per-
ception (perhaps only a claim to the label). These comparisons make the most
sense when we consider the minimal test for an agent-schema pair, the test that
involves the smallest number of features.
Definition 4.3 (Minimal test for induction). The set of feature values tcJ is y ’s a
minimal test for induction for the schema for l at time t , in notation
MTST(σ(l , y, t ),tcJ ), if and only if
1. it is one of y ’s tests for conformity with the schema;
2. it no more test features for the schema than any other of y ’s tests;
3. y induces satisfaction of the schema σ(l , y, t ) on the untested features
from this test.
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In the theory proposed by Hannan et al. (2007), the size of the minimal test
for induction for a category relates directly to the degree of taken for granted-
ness of the category among relevant audiences.
Definition 4.4 (Taken for grantedness). The degree to which an agent takes for
granted that the untested feature values of a labeled producer conform to a
schema for the label at a time point is the ratio of the untested code to the whole
code. The degree to which an agent takes for granted the label at the time point,
G(l , y, t ), is the average of taken for grantedness over the producers to which the
agent assigns the label.
g (l , x, y, t )≡

(I − J )/I if 〈sl1, . . . ,slI 〉∧MTST(σ(l , y, t ),tcJ )
∧(l ∈ lab(x, y, t ));
0 otherwise;
and
G(l , y, t )≡∑x|l∈lab(x,y,t ) g (l , x, y, t )|{x | l ∈ lab(x, y, t )}| .
Note that I indicates the (crisp) cardinality of the set of schema-relevant fea-
tures and J indicates the cardinality of the minimal test. Therefore, this defini-
tion sets g = 0 if the agent does not apply the label to the object or needs to see
every (nonlabel) feature before making an induction (which is no induction at
all); nothing is taken as satisfied by default. It sets g = 1 if applying the label by
itself is enough to shift the agent to defaults about schema-conformity on all
of the other relevant features. In this case, the test on feature values is empty,
J = 0; and the test is passed automatically whenever the label is applied.
We are especially interested in cases in which an audience member takes
satisfaction of a schema for granted generally for the bearers of a label who pass
a very small test code. If such cases the schema-label pair displays a high degree
of taken for grantedness. Making this kind of assessment requires that we con-
sider the levels of taken for grantedness across the relevant producers/products
in the domain at a time point. The relevant ones consist of those to whom the
audience-segment member applies the label at that time point.
Definition 4.5 (Legitimation of a label for an audience). The degree of legiti-
mation of a label at a time point for an (unspecified) audience, L(l , t ), is the
average (over the members of the audience) of the taken for grantedness of the
label.
L(l , t )≡ 1|a|
∑
y∈aG(l , y, t ).
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Legitimation, as we define it, means that the members of the audience treat
the satisfaction of their schemas for the label as defaults for those producers
that pass a test code. If the test code is “thin,” in the sense that it involves a
small subset of the full schema, then much is taken for granted. At the extreme,
simple application of a label is enough to trigger defaults on unperceived fea-
tures. In such a case, a category has the standing of a taken-for-granted element
of the social structure, what Hannan and Freeman (1977) called a form.
Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that modal logic can be a valuable tool for sharpening
social and behavioral theories. The multi-modal language we describe contains
sentential operators that are intensional as well as follow a principle of logical
closure. This means the agents we model can have circumscribed (and some-
times mistaken) understandings of the world around them but are expected
to follow basic patterns of deduction based on the understandings they hold.
This fits well with styles of argumentation needed to express core sociological
concepts such as perception, belief, and valuation.
To model perception-based (as opposed to fact-based) behavior, we treat
perception as providing a set of possible worlds. By specifying accessibility re-
lations between worlds, researchers can build detailed models of the inferential
behavior of belief operators. In our substantive application, we demonstrate
how this approach can be used to construct a model of perception-default-
belief processes that provides a foundation for representing key processes un-
derlying legitimation.
This application allows us to express formally what seems distinctive about
membership in highly legitimated categories. Following the conceptualization
developed by Hannan et al. (2007), we proposed that when a category label is
highly taken for granted by an agent, the default modality applies. Producers
who pass a very small test code will be automatically assigned a full grade of
membership in the category even when many schema-relevant feature values
are not observed.
This substantive application can be used as a basis for formalizing argu-
ments core to other theory fragments within sociological literature. Elsewhere
(Hsu, Hannan, and Pólos 2009) we demonstrate this in a companion paper that
develops formal connections between three theories of categorization: type-
casting, form emergence, and institutionalization. In that paper, we extend
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this conceptualization of category membership assignments to a multiple cat-
egory context to yield dynamics central to each of these theories. In the case of
the typecasting dynamic documented by Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, and von
Rittman (2003), we show that once an audience member accepts a producer as
a full member of a highly taken-for-granted concept, then schema-conforming
defaults are treated as facts when considering membership in other types or
concepts. Unless and until these defaults are directly overridden by new per-
ceptions that show the producer to violate the schema for its original label, they
will continue to hold and define the identity of the producer in the eyes of the
agent.
We conclude this paper by noting that, while sociologists have greater fa-
miliarity with classical first-order logic, dynamic logics (such as modal logic)
can provide more realistic representations of the structure of sociological ar-
guments. The potential benefits for theory-building are considerable. Modal
constructions can be used to sharpen understanding of core concepts, as in the
case of legitimation. They can be used to deepen understanding of the connec-
tions between distinct theory fragments, as in the case of typecasting and form
emergence. And they can also be used to reveal new predictions, as in the case
of institutionalization. By paying greater attention to the formal language used
to express core concepts, researchers can set a better foundation for developing
new and substantively meaningful insights in their formalization efforts.
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